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Abstract: Ambiguity refers to situations where the probability of an event cannot be objectively 
determined. Reasons for ambiguity include a lack of useful historical data or a general disagreement 
among “experts” on what the precise probability of an event is. Ambiguity aversion is defined as an 
aversion to any mean-preserving spread in the probability space. Using the Smooth Ambiguity Model 
proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), we show that ambiguity aversion results in a 
reduction in the proportion of insurance coverage offered by an insurer. This is because an 
ambiguity averse insurer calculates expected utilities by using a “distorted” probability that raises 
the marginal disutility of wealth in the loss state. We also show that, in general, an ambiguity averse 
insurer will not offer more coverage to wealthier agents. Wealthier agents enjoy more coverage 
when the subjective average probability of loss is significantly high. Our results go a long way in 
reconciling theoretical models of insurance under ambiguity with the empirical finding that insurers 























Frank Knight (1921) pointed out the existence of a difference between risk and ambiguity1. 
According to Knight, risk refers to situations where the probability of an event is known, or if not 
known, can be calculated from historical data. Or a risky event is one in which “experts” do not 
disagree on the probability of occurrence. On the other hand, ambiguity refers to situations where 
the probability of an event cannot be objectively determined. Reasons leading to ambiguity might 
include a lack of historical data or a general disagreement among “experts” on what the precise 
probability of an event is. Ambiguity aversion is defined by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) 
as an aversion to any mean-preserving spread in the probability space.  That is an ambiguity averse 
agent prefers the lottery that yields a gain of 100 with probability ½ to another lottery in which the 
probability of earning 100 is uncertain but has a subjective mean of ½, i.e. the agent believes the 
probability of earning a 100 is either ¾ or ¼ with equal probability.  We show, using the smooth 
ambiguity model proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), that ambiguity averse 
insurers offer less insurance coverage than if they were not ambiguity averse. This result is 
consistent with empirical research that finds that insurers are sensitive to ambiguity (Hogarth and 
Kunreuther, 1985; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989; Kunreuther et al, 
1993; Kunreuther et al, 1995; Cabantous, 2007). In addition, we show that ambiguity averse insurers 
do not necessarily increase insurance coverage as the policyholder’s wealth increases. Increase in 
insurance coverage for wealthier individuals is only assured when the subjective average loss 
probability is very large. That is, when insurers believe that there is a very high chance, on average, 
that the loss event will occur.  
Despite numerous empirical studies showing that ambiguity affects insurers’ behaviour, there has 
been little or no theoretical research incorporating this empirical regularity. Most theoretical models 
begin from the premise that the insurer, while having access to historical records, knows the precise 
loss probability while the insured (policyholder) faces ambiguity. We are of the opinion that such an 
approach does not capture much of the experience of selling insurance in developing countries or 
providing insurance for new risks. Consider a subsistence farmer in a remote part of Africa trying to 
insure his plough, or consider a family in a high density township trying to insure their charcoal stove 
against theft or damage. In most developing countries, little or no data is collected regarding the 
number of ploughs stolen or damaged over a time period.  The lack of such data places insurers in 
ambiguous environments forcing them to either offer less than full coverage or in the extreme 
situation decline to offer any coverage at all. New risks also have a similar impact on insurers. It is at 
present difficult to ascertain what the precise risks are from climate change (Treich, 2010). Similarly, 
insurers have a hard time grappling with the risks associated with new diseases such as the swine flu 
epidemic of 2009. The fact that ambiguity is a real problem for insurers has been identified by 
policymakers as an obstacle to providing insurance to the poor (Clarke and Dercon, 2009).     
The traditional approach to fighting poverty has emphasised the importance of market 
imperfections (such as requirements for collateral) in preventing the poor from accumulating assets. 
There is now a realisation that poverty also has a vulnerability element attached to it. The poor may 
fail to accumulate assets, even in the absence of market imperfections, if they are vulnerable to risks 
(ibid.). Such vulnerability forces the poor to diversify into low-risk low-return projects or to 
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accumulate savings in good times and only to deplete them when times are hard. Dercon (2004) 
shows that vulnerability to risk reduces the poor’s welfare in a cross-section of countries. Our 
interest in modelling insurance market-failure in the presence of ambiguity is intended as an 
addition to the literature on how to better supply insurance to the poor. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on ambiguity and 
ambiguity aversion. Section 3 presents the main results of our paper and section 4 concludes.     
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section we review the main contributions to the theoretical and empirical literature on 
ambiguity aversion and uncertainty in general. 
2.1. Theoretical Research 
 Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) are credited with having advanced consumer theory from 
the realm of certainty to one of risk. Before the contribution of von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
choice problems were framed in such a way that the consumer knew that any feasible consumption 
bundle could be obtained with certainty. But reality is fraught with many uncertainties. When buying 
a car, a consumer must consider the future price of petrol, expenditure on repairs and the resale 
value of the car several years later – none of which are known at the time of making the decision 
(Jehle and Reny, 2001). Further, the consumer must also grapple with the fact that the brand new 
car may not arrive as “advertised”. By defining preferences over gambles (or outcomes) von 
Neumann and Morgenstern put forward a set of axioms that guaranteed the existence of an 
expected utility function, essentially a utility function where the utility of each gamble is weighted by 
its probability. Thus a consumer chooses gamble A over B if the expected utility of A exceeds that of 
B.  
In the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) formulation, the probabilities assigned to gambles are 
objective probabilities in the sense that there is no uncertainty regarding what the true probability 
is. But seldom is information sufficient for economic agents to discern objective probabilities. As 
pointed out in the introduction, a scarcity of historical data or a disagreement among “experts” 
might make it difficult for a decision maker to estimate probabilities. The main contribution of 
Savage (1954) was to extend the expected utility paradigm to situations of subjective probabilities – 
situations where objective probabilities were not known. Savage’s approach considers choices 
between two or more uncertain acts. Choices between such gambles reflect both the desirability of 
the outcomes and the probability of the event in question. Consider the following example adapted 
from Gilboa et al (2007): “If horse A wins the race, you get a trip to Paris (otherwise you get 
nothing)” or “if horse B wins you get a trip to London (otherwise you get nothing)”. If you choose 
gamble A, an outside observer might suspect that you thought it more likely that horse A would win 
the race, or that you preferred Paris to London, or that some combination of your beliefs about the 
likely winner and your preferences between the two cities led to the observed choice. The Savage 
axioms were sufficient to guarantee the existence of a subjective expected utility function that 












Morgenstern’s formulation could be applied to situations of uncertainty where probabilities were 
subjective.  
Savage essentially put forward four axioms. The first one is adapted from standard consumer theory, 
whereby agents are presumed to hold complete and transitive preferences over gambles. The next 
two axioms are technical axioms that separate tastes from beliefs. The fourth axiom, called the ‘Sure 
Thing Principle’, was crucial for Savage and has also been the source of much criticism. Consider the 
four gambles G1, G2, G3 and G4. Gamble G1 says “if horse A wins you get a trip to London, 
otherwise you win a trip to Philadelphia”. G2 says “if horse A wins, you get a trip to Paris otherwise 
you get a trip to Philadelphia”. G3 promises a trip to “London if horse A wins otherwise you get a trip 
to Montreal” while G4 says you win a trip to “Paris if horse A wins otherwise you get a trip to 
Montreal”. G1 and G2 only differ if horse A wins. G3 and G4 only differ similarly. The sure thing 
principle says that if you prefer G1 to G2 then you must prefer G3 to G4. Thus the consolation prize 
is irrelevant as long as it is common to both gambles.   
Ellsberg (1961) was the first to subject Savage’s formulation to an empirical test. Ellsberg showed 
that agents violated the sure thing principle in situations where cognitive and informational 
constraints left them uncertain about what odds to apply to events (Klibanoff, et al, 2005). Ellsberg 
suggested the following thought experiment. A subject is shown two urns A and B each containing 
100 balls that are either red or black. Urn A contains 50 black balls and 50 red balls while there is no 
additional information about the proportions of red and black balls in urn B. One ball is drawn at 
random from each urn. Bet 1 is “the ball drawn from urn A is red” and is denoted AR, with AB, BR 
and BB defined likewise. A successful bet carries a prize of $100. Ellsberg was able to observe the 
following preferences over bets: AR  AB  BR  BB. That is agents were indifferent between 
betting on a red ball or a black ball in urn A but preferred betting on urn A than betting on urn B 
even though the same agent was indifferent between red and black in urn B. The results showed 
that there was no probability measure supporting these preferences through subjective expected 
utility maximization. The subjects violated the sure thing principle due to the presence of ambiguity. 
The Ellsberg experiments gave rise to the term ambiguity aversion to describe instances where 
agents preferred bets on probabilized outcomes to non probabilized outcomes. 
The Ellsberg paradox prompted a search for decision models that incorporated ambiguity. The first 
model that gained influence was the Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) model proposed by Schmeidler 
(1989). Schmeidler weakened Savage’s sure thing principle and obtained a representation where 
beliefs are characterized not by a subjective probability but by a capacity , that is, a non-necessary 
additive, increasing set function. The capacity  is defined as follows: Let  be an outcome space, 
and let  be an algebra on . A capacity is a set function  that satisfies 
 and if . The capacity is non-additive in the sense that for any 
two disjoint events  and ,  The last condition would hold with 
equality if  were a probability distribution function (additive capacity). The representation of 
preferences derived by Schmeidler is, letting the random variable  take only two values  
on ,    
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where the last step uses  and   is a utility function. The capacity reflects the 
relative (subjective) likelihoods of the various outcomes, as well as the attitudes towards ambiguity. 
The definition in (1) is equivalent to putting the “left-over” probability mass on the smallest value of 
 over the outcome space. Stated differently, the decision maker underweights bad outcomes 
relative to good outcomes and in this way the theory capture the notion of pessimism. Note that, if 
the capacity is additive, we get back to subjective expected utility as per Savage (1954).     
A setback in Schmeidler’s (1989) model was the difficulty encountered in giving a realistic 
interpretation to the capacity function  and in justifying why such a function represented 
ambiguity. The “Multi Prior” model (or “Maxmin expected utility” model) by Gilboa and Schmeidler 
(1989) was an improvement over the former. With the multi prior model, ambiguity is not 
represented by a unique probability estimate generated by a capacity but by a range of probabilities 
where each probability in the range has a distribution function. Instead of an ambiguous decision 
maker putting the chance of rainfall at 60 percent, the multi prior model says the decision maker is 
better off estimating a range of probabilities, say between 55 and 65 percent. The decision maker 
can then calculate his expected utility for each of the probability distributions and make a decision 
based on the set of expected values obtained. In making a decision, the agent proceeds as follows: 
Assign to each alternative probability estimate the minimum expected value over the set of priors 
and choose the alternative that yields the highest minimum, hence the term “maxmin”. 
Interestingly, the CEU model of Schmeidler (1989) and the multi prior model of Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989) are related. Under the assumption of uncertainty aversion (a key axiom in the 
formulation of the multi prior model), the CEU model is a special case of the multi prior model. In 
that case, the set of priors over which the decision maker takes the minimum has the property of 
being the core of the capacity 2. The core of the capacity  is the set of all probability measures 
relevant to the decision maker; hence the core coincides with the range of probabilities under the 
multi prior model.    
Both the CEU model and the multi prior model have been influential in shaping the way economists 
think about decision making under ambiguity. The two models have been used as points of 
departure in later models of ambiguity aversion. Both the CEU and multi prior models confound the 
concepts of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. The model proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and 
Mukerji (2005) achieves a separation of the two where ambiguity is represented by  second order 
probabilities over first order probabilities (probability over probability) and ambiguity aversion is 
captured by a concave function that transforms expected utility. This model forms the basis of our 
results and is discussed in detail in section 3.  
In as far as insurance is concerned, the CEU and multi prior models have been used to model the 
insurance purchasing decisions of ambiguity averse agents. Andersson (1999) considers a simple 
insurance model where the distribution of accident probabilities in the population is known, but 
where the actual probability of each policyholder is unknown to the policyholder and the insurer. In 
such a setting, with ambiguity averse policyholders, Andersson shows that deductibles are distorted 
downwards. Jeleva (2000) deals with the demand for insurance with a background risk (uninsurable 
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risk) in an ambiguous framework. Jeleva uses the CEU model and finds that when the insurable and 
background risk are comonotone (have positive covariance), the impact of the background risk on 
insurance demand is related to the attitude towards wealth. When the two risks are 
anticomonotone, the attitude towards ambiguity is determinant. Vergote (2009) models insurance 
contracts with one-sided ambiguity: the policyholder is ambiguous about the likelihood of relevant 
events while the insurer does not face ambiguity but is aware that the policyholder does. Vergote’s 
contribution is unique in that he views insurance contracts as possible information transmitters from 
the informed insurer to the uninformed policyholder. Thus in designing a contract, the insurer is 
aware of this fact and the contract is designed so as not to lose this information advantage. Finally, 
Alary, Gollier and Treich (2010) operationalize the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al (2005). 
Like other studies, Alary et al assume ambiguity on the part of the policyholder and conclude that 
ambiguity aversion always raises the demand for self-insurance but may well increase the demand 
for self-protection. Self-insurance is defined as a reduction in the amount of loss whereas the self-
protection refers to a reduction in the loss probability. Alary et al also show that ambiguity aversion 
raises the optimal insurance coverage. 
The main theme running through all the models that apply the concept of ambiguity to insurance is 
that the policyholder is ignorant of the loss probability whereas the insurer is not. We take a 
different approach in this paper, justified by the experience of practitioners and empirical evidence 
(see section 2.2), that ambiguity and the aversion to it, in developing countries at least, falls on the 
part of the insurer.            
2.2 Empirical Research 
In the insurance literature, most empirical studies begin from the assumption that ambiguity and 
ambiguity aversion are prominent among insurers than the insured. These studies then proceed to 
investigate how ambiguity affects insurance purchase decisions. Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) 
pioneered the testing of the ambiguity aversion hypothesis in insurance markets. Einhorn and 
Hogarth begin by assuming ambiguity on the part of both the insurer and the policyholder. They 
assume that only the insurer is averse to ambiguity. The rationale for this is based on the greater 
cost to sellers of insurance from underestimating loss probabilities. Their experimental results 
confirm the hypothesis that ambiguity averse insurers tend to charge higher premiums, than 
otherwise, over the entire range of loss probabilities. Kunreuther, Hogarth and Meszaros (1993) 
conduct a series of experiments investigating the decision processes of actuaries, underwriters and 
reinsurers in setting premiums for ambiguous and uncertain risks. Their survey data on prices 
suggest that all three types of these insurance decision makers set higher premiums when facing 
ambiguity. The follow-up paper by Kunreuther, Meszaros, Hogarth and Spranca (1995) investigates 
whether ambiguity aversion is also present among underwriters who are essentially line managers 
that determine what prices the insurer actually charges in the market place3. They conduct a field 
study of primary-insurance underwriters in a random sample of commercial property-and-casualty 
insurance companies and find that premiums are significantly higher for risks when there is 
ambiguity regarding the probability of a particular event occurring. Cabantous (2007) conducts a 
survey of 78 professional actuaries to test the ambiguity aversion hypothesis. His findings reveal that 
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premiums are significantly higher for risks when there is ambiguity regarding the loss probability. 
Secondly, insurers are sensitive to sources of ambiguity whereby insurers charge a higher premium 
when ambiguity comes from conflict and disagreement regarding the probability of loss than when 
ambiguity comes from imprecision (imprecise forecast about the probability of loss).  
Ambiguity aversion has also been used in finance models to shed light on previous anomalies such as 
the equity premium puzzle, i.e. the finding that the excess return of risky assets is too high to be 
explained by traditional measures of risk and plausible risk aversion parameters (Mehra and 
Prescott, 1985). Studies that incorporate ambiguity aversion in asset pricing show that, because 
financial assets entail ambiguity they are priced pessimistically. Thus such models exhibit an 
ambiguity related premium, which is not captured in risk-based models (Chen and Epstein, 2002; 
Epstein and Schneider 2008; Gollier 2009). Antoniou, Galariotis and Read (2010) investigate the 
source of the size-effect (Banz, 1981) whereby smaller companies tend to outperform larger ones 
without necessarily having larger betas. By using analyst earnings forecasts, they find that the size-
effect arises because small companies are relatively more ambiguous, thus ambiguity averse 
investors respond pessimistically to information about them.             
Ambiguity aversion has been used to investigate a wide range of interesting phenomena. Anagol et 
al (2010) find that ambiguity aversion affects the costume choices of children during Halloween. 
Hayden, Heilbronner and Platt (2010) demonstrate that the preference for unambiguous options by 
human beings is also shared by rhesus macaques – monkeys. These findings are also replicated in 
Rosati and Hare (2011).  
 
3. THE MODEL AND RESULTS 
 In this section we state and prove the paper’s main results. We, however, begin by briefly reviewing 
the smooth ambiguity model proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) hereafter 
referred to as KMM. The representation of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion in KMM forms the 
basis of our results.  
3.1. Smooth Model of Decision Making Under Ambiguity 
KMM propose a model that achieves a separation between ambiguity tastes and ambiguity. The 
former is captured by a preference relation while latter is shown to be consistent with having a 
second order probability distribution over a first order distribution, i.e. a probability over 
probabilities. Such a separation between ambiguity tastes and ambiguity was not possible in the 
pioneering models of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Such separation leads to 
smooth preferences which permit, among other things, comparative statics. In KMM, preferences 
are shown to be represented by a functional of the double expectational form, 
 













   where  is a real valued function defined on the state space  , i.e.  is an act4.  is a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.  is a probability measure on  and  is a map from reals 
to reals.  represents the decision maker’s subjective probability distribution over , the set of all 
probabilities  on . Therefore,  measures the subjective relevance of a particular  as the “right” 
probability. The relationship between  and  gives rise to what is referred to as having a 
‘probability over probabilities’ and thus introduces ambiguity into the setting.  is the expectation 
operator. 
  , as usual, measures attitudes towards risk whereas the shape of  determines whether an 
individual is ambiguity averse, ambiguity neutral or ambiguity loving.  Analogous with the literature 
on risk, concavity, linearity and convexity of  corresponds respectively with ambiguity aversion, 
ambiguity neutrality and ambiguity loving. Whereas risk aversion is an aversion to any mean-
preserving spread in the payoff lottery, ambiguity aversion is defined by KMM as an aversion to any 
mean-preserving spread in the space of probabilities. Consider the example: Ambiguity averse 
agents prefer the lottery that yields a gain of 100 with probability ½ to another lottery in which the 
probability of earning 100 is uncertain but has a subjective mean of ½, i.e. the agent believes the 
probability of earning a 100 is either ¾ or ¼ with equal probability. 
 Within the KMM framework, the evaluation of an act proceeds as follows: “first, compute all 
possible expected utilities of , each expected utility corresponding to a . Next, compute the 
expectation (with respect to the measure  ) of the expected utility transformed by the increasing 
function ” (Klibanoff et al, p.1857, 2005).        
3.2. Main Results 
We now state and prove the main results of our paper. As point of departure, we adopt the model in 
Alary, Gollier and Treich (2010). Their model is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt at 
operationalizing KMM.  
Preliminaries and Assumptions 
We assume that there are two types of agents: Insurers and policyholders. Insurers supply insurance 
and policyholders purchase insurance against the prospect of losing an amount   with 
probability   The probability is ambiguous in the sense that it depends upon an unknown 
parameter . The ambiguity takes the form of a probability distribution for  where  denotes 
the subjective probability of . With respect to the KMM model above,  is identical in 
interpretation with  – the first order probability distribution. is identical to  – the second 
order probability distribution over  (or ).  
Let  be the coverage rate offered by the insurer where  implies full cover and  
implies no coverage offered. Total premiums collected by the insurer depend only the amount of 
coverage  and are defined as, 
 
  (3) 
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where  is the mean of the ambiguous probability distribution .  is the “full 
premium” which is the premium amount that would be collected if the insurer were to offer full 
coverage (i.e.   for ). The representation in (3) captures the premium setting 
behaviour of an insurance company in a competitive market structure. In such a scenario, a profit 
maximizing firm will set the insurance premium per dollar covered equal to the loss probability 
(which is a precise number if the probability is known or an average of the probability distribution if 
it is unknown). Total premiums collected will then equal the premium per dollar covered “times” the 
amount of coverage sold. A numerical example: Suppose a farmer stands to lose $100 worth of crop 
with average loss probability equal to 0.5. Suppose the farmer opts to cover $80 of the loss by 
purchasing an insurance policy. A competitive insurer might then decide to set the premium at 
50cents per dollar covered, thus equating the premium to the average loss probability. This pricing 
rule will lead to zero profits in equilibrium – which is essentially the equilibrium condition for a firm 
in a competitive market structure. The insurer then collects a total of $40 (i.e. $80  $0.50 = $40). 
Using (3) we can obtain the $40 by setting  (80% coverage),  (total loss) and  
. Thus the representation in (3) is consistent with price setting behaviour in a competitive 
insurance setting (see Hogarth et al, 1989). Note also that  is constant as   is always constant (it’s 
an average) and the loss amount    is fixed apriori. In as far as meeting his objectives is concerned, 
the insurer is only free to adjust the coverage rate . The leads insurer’s value function is thus given 
by, 
   (4)     
where  is the expectation operator,  is an increasing transformation function from reals to reals 
whose shape (concave, linear or convex) determines the insurer’s attitude towards ambiguity.  
represents the expected utility resulting from offering coverage  and is given by, 
   (5)        
where   is a standard concave utility function.  and   represent the insurer’s wealth in the loss 
and no loss states respectively (assuming only two states of nature).  and  are defined as, 
  and     (6) 
with  representing initial insurer wealth and   is the indemnity or the amount paid out in the 
event the policyholder suffers a loss5. Clearly .  
We now state and prove the paper’s four propositions. 
Proposition 1 An ambiguity averse insurer offers less coverage than an ambiguity neutral insurer.  
Proof  
An ambiguity averse insurer faces the following maximization problem 
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  (7) 
where   is concave as the insurer is ambiguity averse.  is also concave due to the concavity of 
the utility function  .  The first order condition for the problem in (7) is 
   (8) 
The first and second order conditions are satisfied due to the concavity of the value function 6. 
The first order condition in (8) essentially gives the insurer’s marginal change in expected utility 
adjusted for ambiguity.  is the expected marginal utility of  and is given as 
 (9).   
From (9) the expected marginal utility of coverage is the difference between marginal utility in the 
loss state, which is non-positive as 7, and marginal utility in the no loss state which always 
positive. An ambiguity neutral insurer has a   that is linear and their first order condition is given as 
    (10)   
Recall that an ambiguity neutral agent is indifferent to a mean preserving spread in the probability 
space (see 3.1 on the KMM model). Hence  for the ambiguity neutral agent takes on the 
following form 
  (11) 
whereas before   is the mean of the probability of loss. Let  be the optimal 
insurance coverage under ambiguity neutrality so that  
  (12) 
Since the value function in (4) is concave, an ambiguity averse insurer will offer less coverage than 
 if and only if 
  (13) 
Since  by the assumption of ambiguity aversion (i.e. concavity assumption), for (13) to hold 
we need to show that   
or which is the same thing 
8  (14). 
Similarly (12) can be rewritten as 
  (15). 
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Alary, Gollier and Treich (2010) show that an ambiguity averse agent computes expected utility by 
using a ‘distorted’ probability  (see appendix for proof) where 
     (16) 
Thus we can rewrite (14) as 
 (17). 
Comparing (15) and (17) and noting that   concludes the proof  
In evaluating expected utility, the ambiguity averse insurer settles on the distorted probability  as 
the “right” probability of loss. This has the effect of raising the marginal disutility of coverage offer in 
the loss state (which always non-positive as )  relative to the marginal utility in the no loss 
state which always positive. On a net basis, therefore, the ambiguity averse insurer experiences 
expected marginal disutility in offering additional coverage and this generates the result.    
 
Proposition 2 For an ambiguity averse insurer, an increase in ambiguity results in a reduction in the 
insurance coverage offered.  
Proof 
Let  be differentiable so that  . This assumption induces , i.e.   
   (18) 
 
            
 is less than zero because by assumption  and we know that  (wealth in the 
loss state is less than wealth in the no loss state) . (18) tells us that an increase in  results in a 
decrease in the insurer’s expected utility. Therefore, increasing  must be akin to increasing the 
amount of ambiguity (or vagueness) around the occurrence of loss. We can, therefore, prove 
proposition 2 by showing that    
  (18).     
The derivative in (18) can be signed by using the implicit function theorem. The implicit-function 
theorem states that: Provided an implicit function for  is known to exist for the equation  
 , then the partial derivative of  with respect to  is given by, 
   (  1, 2, …,  )  (19). 
By setting  equal to the first order condition (8) we have, 












By the implicit function theorem, (18) is defined as 
    (21)    
Since our objective function is concave and the choice set  is convex, the Weierstrass 
extreme value theorem (see appendix for statement) tells us that an implicit function for  does 
exist for the equation in (20). From (21)  is defined (by using the product rule of differentiation) as 
 (22). 
From (22) we need to determine the sign of . Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to  yields, 
 (23) 
         =  
        
(23) is less than zero because by assumption  and we know that  ( recall that   
and since  , it must be that ), implying that the term in square brackets in the 
second line of (23) is negative.  
Concavity implies that in (22),  and  are positive. If we assume that the cross-partial derivative 
 is positive9 and recalling from (18) and (23) that  and  are both negative, we have the 
result that  is negative. We now need to determine the sign of . By the product rule of 
differentiation we have 
                (24) 
In (24),   and  are both less than zero by concavity.  is positive by concavity. The 
implication is that the two terms on the RHS of (24) are both negative, hence .  
To recap, since we have established that   and  are less than zero, from the implicit function 
theorem we must have 
. This concludes the proof  
  
Proposition 3 Given two ambiguity averse insurers with the same probability distribution functions 
 and , with insurer A more ambiguity averse than insurer B (in the sense that A’s 
transformation  is more concave than B’s transformation function ), then insurer A will offer 
less coverage than insurer B.  
Proof         
 Since  is more concave than , we can define  as  
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    (25) 
where  is a strictly increasing and concave function. In other words,  is a concave 
transformation of . Let be the optimal coverage offered by insurer B such that 
 (26). 
To show that  is more coverage than would be offered by insurer A, it must be that 
  (27) 
because A’s objective function is concave. We can use (25) to rewrite (27) as 
  (28). 
By Jensen’s Inequality (see appendix for statement) we have 
 (29)   
By (26), the LHS of (29)  equals zero. Therefore, (29) becomes 
 . 
And this concludes the proof  
3.3. An Extension: Ambiguity Aversion and Wealth Inequality 
Fischer (1973) proposes a life cycle model of insurance purchases under conditions of quantifiable 
risk. Fischer’s main result is that insurance purchases follow the life cycle pattern of earnings. That is, 
individuals tend to purchase less coverage in earlier times when incomes are little and purchase 
more insurance in later life when incomes rise. Fischer’s result also has a cross sectional 
interpretation: At any point in time, wealthier individuals tend to purchase more insurance than less 
wealthier individuals. Fischer’s prediction has been confirmed by empirical evidence that suggests 
that insurance companies tend to over-sell insurance to wealthier agents for quantifiable risks 
(Schoen et al, 2000). In this section we try to establish whether Fischer’s prediction is robust to the 
introduction of ambiguity. This leads us to the following proposition. 
Proposition 4 Provided that the subjective average loss probability  is very large, an 
ambiguity averse insurer will provide more insurance coverage to wealthier individuals. 
Proof 
To prove the proposition, we need to adjust the model to incorporate differing wealth levels on the 
part of the policyholder. Assume that the loss suffered in the bad state is a function of policyholder 
wealth   , i.e. 10. Further assume that  is differentiable with , i.e. losses 
increase in policyholder wealth. This assumption says that wealthier policyholders invest more of 
their wealth in risky projects. In other words, we are assuming that policyholders have absolute risk 
aversion. The insurer’s problem is now given as 
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   (30) 
where, 
  (31) 
with insurer wealth in loss and no loss states defined respectively as 
 and     (32).    
As before, the ‘full premium’ is given as  and  is the insurer’s initial wealth. First order 
conditions for the problem in (30) are given as 
 (33) 
To show that an increase in policyholder wealth   increases coverage  , we need to show that 
         (34) 
We again invoke the implicit function theorem (see proposition 2) to sign the derivative in (34). By 
the implicit function theorem 
                                    (35)       
where     (36). 
From (24) we know that . Thus the derivative in (35) is positive if and only if  . By the 
product rule we have  
       (37). 
Evaluating  yields, 
                                       (38). 
                                    
Where  is the derivative of the utility function with respect to  . We need to evaluate . Recall 
that from (9)   is 
  
         . (39) 
Applying the product rule to (39) yields  as11 
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 Note that  must be distinguished from . The former (big “U”) refers to the expected utility function 












 ′ ′+1−     ′ + ′   ′      (40) 
The expression in (40) can be simplified by collecting like terms to obtain 
       ′ + ′  ′                            (41) 
Looking at (37) we know that  and  by concavity. The cross partial derivative  
by assumption.  Thus (37) is positive if and only if  and  The two derivatives are 
simultaneously positive when the average loss probability  is very large12, i.e. when  . This 
concludes the proof   
Stated differently, the result above suggests that if the insurer does not consider the average 
probability of loss to be very high (i.e.  ), the effect of increased policyholder wealth on 
coverage offered is ambiguous. For a very small  , the net result will depend on the type of 
utility function adopted by the insurer. Proposition 4 arises from the fact that a very high  
significantly reduces the marginal disutility of coverage in the loss state relative to the marginal 
utility of coverage in the no loss state. In the extreme condition where , marginal disutility 
in the loss state is equal to zero. This result essentially stems from the fact that a high  
increases insurer wealth in the loss state relative to the no loss state (see definitions in (32).    
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Using the smooth ambiguity model proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), our paper 
has shown that ambiguity and the aversion to it on the part of the insurer leads to a decrease in the 
amount of coverage offered for uncertain risks. Specifically, we have shown that an ambiguity averse 
insurer offers less coverage than an ambiguity neutral insurer. Correspondingly, given two ambiguity 
averse insurers whereby one is more averse to ambiguity than the other, the more averse insurer 
offers less coverage. Further, our paper shows that the Fischer (1973) result whereby wealthier 
individuals are offered more coverage is not robust to the introduction of ambiguity. Specifically, 
ambiguity averse insurers will offer more coverage to wealthier agents when the subjective average 
loss probability is sufficiently high.  
Our results are in line with most of the empirical research that finds that insurers are sensitive to 
ambiguity. This goes a long way in reconciling the theoretical modelling of ambiguity in insurance 
with empirical regularities. Most of the modelling of ambiguity in insurance begins from the premise 
that the insurer possesses sufficient knowledge to calculate objective loss probabilities. We are, 
however, of the opinion that this is not usually the case for insurers covering risks in developing 
countries or for insurers covering new risks. The lack of basic data capture on such variables as crime 
patterns in developing countries makes the calculation of loss probabilities problematic. Further, the 
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 By examining the second line in (38), we notice that a very large  makes the term in square bracket equal 
to zero thus making the derivative positive. Similarly examining (41) reveals that a large  makes the term in 












onset of new diseases such as the swine flu epidemic of 2009 makes assessment of risks emanating 
from such epidemics difficult to discern. The position we take is supported by the experiences of 
insurance policymakers who identify insurer ambiguity as an obstacle in supplying insurance to the 




































APPENDIX 1: Alary, Gollier and Treich (2010) result on Distorted Probabilities. 
Alary, Gollier and Treich consider the problem of an ambiguity averse individual attempting to self-
protect against uncertainty13. Let  be the infinitesimal reduction in the loss probability resulting 
from successful self-protection. And let  be the willingness to pay for this reduction in risk.  
Assume that the agent suffers a loss of  in the loss state and assume that the agent has no 
insurance. The value for this type of agent is given as: 
  (A1.1)    
      (A1.2) 
whereas before  is a standard concave utility function,  is concave,  is the loss probability 
and  is the agent’s initial wealth. Straight forward computations lead to 
     (A1.3) 
This can be rewritten as follows: 
      (A1.4) 
In which  is the distorted probability of loss that is defined as 
    (A1.5) 
To show that : Suppose without loss of generality that  is increasing in . It implies from  
(A1.2) that  is decreasing in . Under ambiguity aversion  is decreasing, which implies 
that  is increasing in  . By the covariance rule, it implies that the numerator in equation 
(A1.5) is larger than . It implies that  
. 
 
APPENDIX 2: Weierstrass Existence of Extreme Values (Jehle and Reny 2001). 
Let  be a continuous real-valued mapping from where  is a nonempty compact subset 
of . Then there exists a vector  and a vector  such that 
  for all   
 
 
                                                          
13
 As pointed out in the introduction, the standard approach in this literature is to assume ambiguity aversion 












APPENDIX 3: Jensen’s Inequality (Varian, 1992) 
Let  be a nondegenerate random variable and  be a strictly concave function of this random 
variable. Then . The opposite is true if  is convex.  
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